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On September 6th, 2018, Amber Guyger, an off-duty Dallas police officer, mistakenly 
entered the wrong apartment after coming home from work and fatally shot her Black unarmed 
neighbor, Botham Jean, as he sat in his home eating ice cream (Allyn 2019). Following this 
tragedy, moments after Ms. Guyger’s emotional testimony and her sentencing to ten years in 
prison, the brother of the victim, Brandt Jean, stood up in the courtroom and addressed Ms. 
Guyger: “Again, I love you as a person, and I don't wish anything bad on you. I don't know if 
this is possible, but can I give her a hug, please? Please?” (All things considered, 2019). After 
Brandt Jean forgave and hugged Ms. Guyger, the judge, Tammy Kemp, wiped tears from her 
eyes, hugged the Jean family, and then proceeded to hug the defendant, Amber Guyger. 
This instance of a Black person forgiving a white individual under an extraordinary 
circumstance is one that continually reoccurs. We see a similar circumstance in the shooting at 
the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, where a white 
supremacist, Dylann Roof, entered into this “historically black place of worship” and shot and 
killed nine people (Ali, 2019). In response to this shooting, Nadine Collier, the daughter of 
victim Ethel Lance, told Roof at his hearing, "I forgive you ... You took something really 
precious from me. I will never talk to her ever again, I will never be able to hold her again, but I 
forgive you and have mercy on your soul” (Ali, 2019). Not long after, two more family members 
of the victims stood up in the hearing to publicly forgive Roof for his actions (Ali, 2019). 
These acts of forgiveness from Brandt Jean, Judge Tammy Kemp, and the families of the 
Emanuel Church shooting triggered an emotional outcry from the public. The social media 






perspectives. Many people consider Brandt Jean’s forgiveness as a beautiful act of mercy that 
provides the rest of humanity with an “incredible lesson of love and forgiveness” (Grant, 2019). 
For this reason, the Institute for Law Enforcement Administration chose to honor Brandt with the 
2019 Ethical Courage Award (Li, 2019). Others, however, are deeply troubled by this 
forgiveness. One Twitter user posted, “Only thing Brandt Jean’s #forgiveness has done is give 
racist white people a new go-to ‘You people should be more like…’ example to weaponize 
against black people when they do something horrific and racist and don’t want to be held 
accountable” (Dav-O, 2019). In response to an ABC news article on Amber Guyger’s 
sentencing, Preston Mitchell tweeted a reply: “The sad truth is that people will look at Brandt 
Jean (and others) forgiveness and continue that as the standard for Black people who aren’t 
forgiving. Black people are historically forced to show empathy to colonizers and made to feel 
bad when we don’t” (Mitchell, 2019). 
Each comment reflects the opposing opinions over what is a nationwide tendency of 
Black people forgiving white people for their unspeakably violent and racist actions. While 
forgiveness in the traditional sense is believed by most people to be an inherently good value, 
there is something about the performance of these particular acts of forgiveness that goes beyond 
our normative understanding of forgiveness’s meaning and implications. It is far too simplistic to 
cast aside these actions as being bad, for many of the intentions are rooted in a virtuous spirit. 
And yet, the discordant responses from the public who witnessed the performance of 
forgiveness, as shown via the twitter responses, indicates that this type of forgiveness impacts 
people beyond the actors directly involved in two very polarized ways. For those who see the 





of the Emanuel shooting on social media for being model citizens. They share and repost the 
story so that others may read about the heroic act and give further appreciation. Juxtaposed to 
this commentary, others feel as though this forgiveness is mistakenly understood as forgiveness 
spoken on behalf of the entire Black community, and do not want to be compared to the actions 
of these actors. 
Taking these reactions into account, there is something worth being explored in these 
instances of forgiveness. Though they can be seen as mere expressions of grace, when occurring 
interracially the significance behind the performance of forgiveness surpasses that of emotional, 
religious meaning, or even forgiveness on simply an interpersonal level. It is a significance that 
has yet to be fully explained by the world of academia. Therefore to understand what is 
occurring within these tender moments of forgiveness between Amber Guyger and Brandt Jean, 
or between the families of the Emanuel victims to whom were murdered by Dylann Roof, a new 
definition of forgiveness is needed to understand its impact, and why we should approach this 
performance of forgiveness with caution. 
The moment Brandt Jean walked up to the podium and forgave Amber Guyger, an act the 
entire country witnessed, Jean participated in an act of Black racial forgiveness whether or not he 
intended to do so. So too did family members during the hearing for the Emanuel African 
Methodist Episcopal Church shooting. Black racial forgiveness is understood as a politically 
significant performance of racial sacrifice following interracial harm. I argue that this 
performance consequently serves to restore the status quo of race relations (i.e. the maintenance 
of white supremacy). It should be noted that Black racial forgiveness does not necessitate, nor 





promote the structures of white supremacy through their forgiveness. Rather, Black racial 
forgiveness has the unintended consequence of reinforcing white dominance that is often 
unnoticed. It is for this reason why it is so important to understand its mechanisms. In addition, 
while hypothetically racial forgiveness can be performed by white individuals, however, the 
meaning would be changed. This is because the implications for white racial forgiveness lack a 
political significance given their status as the majority. For this paper, white people will not be 
included within the definition. Instead, the focus will remain on the implications of Black racial 
forgiveness. 
By defining Black racial forgiveness in this way, it excludes all instances of forgiveness 
whereby the act does not involve broader, public, racial implications. We can see racial 
forgiveness manifest itself within the public, interpersonal and aggregate spheres, all of which 
will be individually explained within this thesis. I hypothesize that Black racial forgiveness 
delegitimizes the case for Black activism due to the norm of Black racial forgiveness labeling all 
other performances of civil disobedience as deviant behavior. Put simply, Black racial 
forgiveness undermines Black people’s moral and rhetorical basis for political challenges to the 
racial status quo of white supremacy. Scholarly work by Juliet Hooker in her essay “Black Lives 
Matter and the Paradoxes of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic 
Repair,” and Danielle Allen’s Talking to Strangers will help inform this argument. 
By arguing that Black racial forgiveness reifies white supremacy, this paper seeks to 
challenge the normative idea of forgiveness’ ability to repair existing relationships, and instead 
argues that Black racial forgiveness returns the relationship to the status quo ante of injustice and 
racial domination. It does so by upholding the Racial Contract as theorized by Charles Mills and 





referring to whiteness throughout this paper, it is “conceptualized as a constellation of processes 
and practices rather than as a discrete entity (i.e. skin color alone)” (DiAngelo, p. 56). Moreover, 
it is also thought of as a “location of structural advantage, of race privilege. Second, it is a 
‘standpoint,’ a place from which White people look at ourselves, at others, and at society. Third, 
‘Whiteness’ refers to a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed. (p.1)” 
(DiAngelo, p. 56). 
In this thesis, I will attempt to develop a clear understanding of the concept of Black 
racial forgiveness. By using other author’s argumentative frameworks, I will use their arguments 
and ideas to help outline what Black racial forgiveness is, and what it is not. I believe this 
political concept is extremely pertinent in today’s political context in which so many people are 
unable to see past the invisible structures of white supremacy. While developing my concept of 
racial forgiveness I will not attempt to prove the existence of white supremacy, for it is assumed 
a given fact. Rather, by developing the concept of racial forgiveness and explaining how it fits 
into our society today, I hope to create a debate surrounding how we use forgiveness and what it 
is worth. 
Racial forgiveness is not an explicit term that is found in literature, nor are its 
implications for the maintenance of the racial hierarchy. Nonetheless, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, its presence remains a fact within our society. For this reason, the literature on 
moral and critical race theory in addition to themes of sacrifice will be used to understand the 





To begin, Black racial forgiveness is understood to be a subset of political forgiveness, as 
understood and defined by the conditions outlined by P.E. Digeser in Political Forgiveness. 
Traditionally, the act of interpersonal forgiveness is one we are most familiar with, and is 
understood to be a “set of performances that releases people from their past actions” (Digeser, 
p. 11). Generally, the grounds for this normative forgiveness are rooted in the intent to release 
the emotional weight burdening each actor involved and done out of earnest to move forward 
with a new relationship that is now free from all previous “wrongful actions” and “unbearable 
debts” (Digeser, p. 11). When comparing this form of forgiveness to political forgiveness, a few 
key differences exist. 
The concept of political forgiveness is rooted in an “agency-based conception of politics” 
with the belief that in politics, “actions are more important than sentiments” (Digeser, p. 35). 
Therefore, the intent behind political forgiveness is not rooted in religious beliefs nor is it in 
search of an emotional release. Rather it can be thought of as a utilitarian contract between two 
actors in which the victim agrees to release the transgressor's debt with the goal being to restore 
the relationship to the status quo ante (Digeser, 2001). Political forgiveness is distinct from other 
forms of forgiveness because the motives and sentiments are considered to be irrelevant, for the 
“actor is pursuing a desired end by publicly subscribing to a set of moral practices and rules” 
(Digeser, p. 4). Therefore, rather than being an emotional release, political forgiveness is better 
understood as a contract to forgive (Digeser, 2001). A contract, meaning that the forgiver agrees 






The objective and purpose of political forgiveness is to invite the “process of 
reconciliation, even if an ultimate state of reconciliation is never obtained” (Digeser, p. 69). If 
the debt is released and the process of reconciliation is unable to be achieved, political 
forgiveness is still understood to be successful. For political forgiveness to occur and be 
successful, the following conditions must be in place; a relationship must exist between the 
actors and debt must be owed from one actor to another. This debt can be of moral, financial, or 
legal significance. Next, the debt must be relieved by an actor with the authority to forgive. 
Lastly, the forgiveness must be conveyed with the proper signals. This includes being in a public 
setting and clearly stating the intent to forgive so that all participants understand the debt is 
pardoned. After one has been politically forgiven and the above conditions are met, the debtor is 
now considered to be on an equal footing because the past is considered to be reconciled even 
though one can still harbor resentment towards the transgressor. The transgressor's civic standing 
is also restored, for the public acknowledges that the debt can no longer be held against the 
victim. 
According to Digeser, the “success of this act is independent from its motivations” 
(Digeser, p. 24). Therefore, “the emotional or internal states of forgivers are largely irrelevant to 
the act of forgiving,” which is distinct from all other forms of forgiveness (Digeser, p. 20). Thus, 
just as Digeser compares the capability of humans to exercise forms of “self-control, civility, 
manners…” in certain situations that require separating our emotions from our actions, we are 
also capable of separating sentiment from the act of forgiveness (Digeser, p. 24).Digeser 
acknowledges the power some actions evoke when associated with strong emotion, such as a 
courageous act for the sake of love, yet in the context of politics, he believes this normative 





the recesses of the human heart” (Digeser, p.25). If forgiveness in politics requires an emotional 
release from the forgiver for the act to occur, due to being unable to see into the “human heart,” 
we will never know whether the transgressor truly has been forgiven by the victim (Digeser, 
2001, p. 25). This is why political forgiveness as a political concept is useful for achieving 
effective reconciliation in politics because once someone is politically forgiven, it is a definite 
action that requires no foresight from either party as to whether the forgiveness genuinely came 
from the heart. 
It should also be noted here, that a person can hold onto their resentment while 
participating in political forgiveness. Digeser does not explicitly outline this in his text, however, 
it is likely he supports this view because he never states that political forgiveness is an exclusive 
act. This means that one can both politically forgive, while also emotionally or religiously 
forgiving an actor – for these are conceptualized as separate acts with different intent. 
Furthermore, when conceptualizing political forgiveness, it is important to think of it only in 
terms of the utilitarian set of conditions outlined above. To reiterate, it is in line with an “agency-
based conception of politics,” so the political concept should be thought of as more of a 
transaction rather than a self-enacted action (Digeser, p. 18). Therefore, I believe Digeser would 
contend that political forgiveness can exist alongside forgiveness that is motivated by one’s 
emotional motives or religious traditions. The same goes for the emotional forgiveness of a 
political wrong. Just because it is a political wrong that is being forgiven does not necessitate 
that it be political forgiveness from the forgiver. If the conditions for political forgiveness are not 





Congressman for his lack of response to her petition -- then it can simply be an interpersonal 
form of normative forgiveness with no political forgiveness involved. 
To further clarify the concept of political forgiveness, we can turn to the fictional 
example of a man named Michael Scout who is choosing to forgive his neighbor Pam Brown, a 
woman who hit his car earlier in the week and failed to tell him about the damage. The first 
aspect of political forgiveness is met, for there exists a relationship between two parties. 
Moreover, there is also debt that is owed to Michael on behalf of Pam for her wrongful behavior, 
therefore the third criterion is established. Next, for Michael to politically forgive Pam he must 
be of appropriate “standing” to obtain the authority to forgive her. Given that Michael is the 
victim of Pam’s action, this gives Michael the authority to forgive her according to Digeser’s 
outlined conditions. It is important to note regarding authority, that Digeser does consider 
vicarious forgiveness to be included in his conception of political forgiveness. He argues that 
while the victim should be given the first opportunity to forgive politically, others can obtain the 
authority to forgive if the victim is “unwilling or unable to forgive” (Digeser, p.91). 
To continue, when Michael performs the act of forgiveness, he chooses to do so at the 
local city council meeting. During this meeting, he clearly conveys his intent to forgive Pam so 
that both she, as well as the other community members, understand Pam’s debt is now forgiven. 
By making his forgiveness “publicly verifiable,” Michael allows for a common understanding of 
the situation (Digeser, 2001, p. 57). Juxtaposed to normative forgiveness, if one is simply using 
forgiveness to free themselves of resentment, then for Michael to successfully forgive Pam he 
does not need to communicate the idea clearly to her or anyone else because he would only need 
to “free oneself of resentment” (Digeser, 2001, p. 29). Moreover, by making his forgiveness 





-- for he conveyed it with the “force” needed to ensure complete clarity of the situation to 
everyone involved (Digeser, 2001, p.28).  
Digeser refers to this final step in the process as the “uptake” (Digeser, p. 29). In his 
argument, he states that if the debtor does not understand that they are forgiven, then the “full 
political character of the act cannot be realized and the possibilities for restoration are abridged” 
(Digeser, p. 29). Another way one might think about it is, “the actions of a jailer, who releases a 
criminal without informing her that she has been pardoned may just as easily be interpreted as 
corruption, a setup, or a mistake” (Digeser, p. 29). 
Following the “uptake,” Pam is now politically forgiven, regardless of whether Michael 
continues to be angry with her (Digeser, p. 29). By Michael seeing his relationship with Pam as 
one that is “worthy of respect and repair,” he politically forgave her to invite the possibility of 
restoration (Digeser, p. 28). While Michael did not receive rectificatory justice in terms of 
receiving what is owed, such as Pam paying for his car to be fixed, he did allow for the 
possibility to restore his and Pam’s relationship to being civil neighbors – the status quo ante. 
Thanks to Michael publicly affirming his forgiveness to the public, he sent a “message to others 
to invite a process of reconciliation” (Digeser, p. 5). The public is now aware that Pam is 
forgiven and can, therefore, move on from the resentment they may harbor towards her. The 
contract to forgive is now established because the past is settled, the debt is successfully released 
and the opportunity to establish a “civic friendship” is restored (Digeser, p. 69). 
This concept of political forgiveness, Digeser argues, offers us a solution when 
rectificatory justice cannot occur. Thanks to its “reconciliatory effects,” Digeser promotes the 
idea that political forgiveness can provide a similar “state of peace” or sense of good that justice 





Now that political forgiveness is clearly defined, we must return to the original argument, 
Black racial forgiveness is a form of political forgiveness. This is because for it to be an act of 
racial forgiveness, it must be a politically significant performance of racial sacrifice that is in the 
service of maintaining white supremacy. The act of Black racial forgiveness as I define it meets 
several of the conditions outlined by Digeser including the existence of a relationship, a debt 
being owed between the actors involved, the ability for the act to restore the transgressor’s civil 
standing, and the condition that one must not emotionally forgive the debtor for the forgiveness 
to be successful. 
Moreover, while Black racial forgiveness is political and Digeser’s framework sets up 
some of the conditions for the act succinctly, Black racial forgiveness does not conform 
concisely to Digeser’s argument. To begin, racial forgiveness diverges from Digeser’s definition 
of political forgiveness because it is not exclusively a public act, for it can occur in interpersonal 
interactions and be applied to an aggregate group. While the proper signs and force are still 
necessary to ensure every party understands that racial forgiveness occurred, it does not need to 
be verified by the public to still facilitate the maintenance of white supremacy. Private 
interpersonal forms of Black racial forgiveness occur when the forgiveness of a white 
transgressor allows them to continue their dominance of white supremacy in other public 
settings. Therefore, while this interaction is inherently private, racial forgiveness remains 
politically significant because its implications go on to affect other people’s lives in various 
public settings. 
Furthermore, both interpersonal and public forms of Black racial forgiveness can 
transform into “non-random aggregate” forgiveness when a larger group is affected by the act of 





this phenomenon occurs when the victim of an act is a “member of a nonrandom aggregate,” 
meaning they are a part of a group that is united by a defining feature, such as religion, race, or 
gender (Digeser, p. 113). Thus, the specific harm that is being forgiven must be a wrongdoing 
that “reverberates to all those who share the ascribed characteristic of identity” (Digeser, p. 112). 
When racial forgiveness involves a nonrandom aggregate group, the initial transgression that is 
being forgiven must be directed towards an individual who shares a characteristic with a larger 
group to whom feel the harm is “distributed throughout the group” (Digeser, p. 112). In the case 
of Amber Guyger, while her actions did not pose an immediate threat to every Black person, her 
racially charged actions are seen as a threat to members of the Black community and an 
“offense,” to all members of the community (Digeser, p. 114). Therefore, this question of who 
can forgive in situations where the forgiveness involves broader meaning for an aggregate group 
is still considered Black racial forgiveness. 
Lastly, and most significantly, in political forgiveness, a key feature of its intended effect 
is to return the relationship to the status quo ante so that both parties may move forward with the 
past now reconciled. When applying this to Black racial forgiveness, it implies a disregard for 
the historical past of racially motivated wrongdoings and results in returning the relationship to 
the status quo of inequality and injustice. Therefore, the model Digeser describes no longer can 
be viewed with the same optimistic virtues. The effects of racial forgiveness unlike political 
forgiveness, do not allow for the “restoration of the civil and moral equality of transgressors and 
their victims” (Digeser, p. 28). When equality never existed in the status quo ante, this after then 
only serves to restore the relationship of white supremacy to its original standing. 
According to Digeser, political forgiveness’ purpose is to invite reconciliation through 





status quo ante (Digeser, 2001). However, when the actors performing the political forgiveness 
are interracial and the contract is with a debtor who is white and a forgiver who is non-white, the 
stage in which the contract is entered into is no longer equal. Thus, for Digeser’s political 
forgiveness to occur, it depends on a neutral contract from the onset of forgiveness. 
We can use an example here of a couple that is fighting. If one partner politically forgives 
the other, that is great. They are now no longer fighting and can move on with the relationship. 
However, let’s say that the status quo ante of the relationship is toxic, and before the fight 
occurred one partner frequently abused the other. In Digeser’s conceptual architecture, his 
argument only is beneficial when a healthy relationship existed before political forgiveness, so 
that the status quo ante is something that is valued and worth of repair. For Black racial 
forgiveness, the preexisting relationship is the later example of toxicity. Black racial forgiveness 
as political forgiveness is, therefore, unable to return the relationship to a healthy one, if a 
healthy relationship never existed prior. Rather, it returns the relationship to the preexisting 
racial contract of white supremacy. As expressed, Black racial forgiveness is indeed political 
concerning many of the conditions outlined by Digeser, however, because the existence of white 
supremacy presupposes the act, Digeser’s argument has a different meaning when the status quo 
ante of the relationship is white dominance.  
This status quo ante of white supremacy that distinguishes Black racial forgiveness from 
political forgiveness can be better understood as a racial contract. This paper will adopt the 
concept of white supremacy as understood by the framework of Charles Mills’ theories in the 
Racial Contract to help support this argument. According to Mills, white supremacy exists in our 
society as a “political system, a particular structure of formal or informal rule…” (Mills, p. 3, 





influence is by theorizing a state of nature in which the government and contract were first 
formed. A contract containing political, moral, and epistemological meaning, these layers of 
influence are bound together to form what Mills refers to as the “Racial Contract.” The racial 
contract is Mills’ way of explaining the creation of our society, and a tool to critique our social 
psychology and expose the functions of a government that helps to create mass inequalities and 
overall “racial domination” (Mills, p. 6, 1997). It is this racial contract that preexists and 
undermines the neutral contract contended by Digeser’s argument when applied to Black racial 
forgiveness. 
According to Mills’ the only way in which we can tackle the racial injustices in our 
country is by theorizing the formation of our government so that we can better understand how it 
operates today. It is only after this reflection that he believes we can form a new contract that 
truly places everyone on equal grounds. A contract that is created with input from the voices of 
many, no longer solely just of voices of the privileged. Mills’ theories help to supplement why 
conceptualizing Black racial forgiveness as purely a form of political forgiveness is problematic, 
by taking into account the preexisting sociopolitical realities that prevent the relationship from 
returning to one on equal grounds. By understanding how racial injustice is created and 
maintained, it also helps us to understand why the roles of who is forgiven and who is the 
forgiver are determined far before Brandt Jean made his decision to step up to the podium that 
day to forgive Amber Guyger. 
Distinguished from other social contract theories, the racial contract is an agreement that 
is only constructed between members of one racial group – a group who believe themselves to be 
the only people who “count” (Mills, p. 3). Therefore, the rules of the contract do not apply to 





considered to benefit from the Contract itself (Mills, p. 11).  
Mills goes further to understand white supremacy as a political system. He claims that in 
the “pre-political” state, white men are considered to already be “sociopolitical beings,” (Mills, p. 
13). Therefore, as the state and its political institutions are created, the motivation is not to 
protect each citizen, as proposed by Hobbes, but rather the systems are designed to “maintain and 
reproduce this racial order, securing the privileges and advantages of the full white citizens and 
maintaining the subordination of nonwhites” that already exist in the state of nature (Hobbes, 
1978) (Mills, p. 14). In this conception of white supremacy, those who are white are responsible 
for upholding this whiteness. If they do not maintain these responsibilities, they are considered to 
be in “dereliction of their duties as citizens (Mills, p. 14). Therefore, Mills states that “from the 
inception, then, race is in no way an ‘afterthought,’ a ‘deviation’ from ostensibly raceless 
Western ideals, but rather a central shaping constituent of those ideals” (Mills, p. 14). 
Concerning the moral contract, Mills contends that the political contract “codifies” a set 
of moral codes that value whiteness in the “state of nature” (Mills, p. 14-15). Moreover, the 
moral contract is simply the establishment of these moral codes into the foundation of society 
“by which the citizens are supposed to regulate their behavior,” and consequently, maintain the 
institutionalization of white supremacy (Mills p. 10). Mill’s moral contract contradicts the 
traditional philosophy of a social contract where all men are considered to be free and equal in 
the natural state (Mills, 1997). Under the racial contract, since it excludes nonwhite participation, 
“natural freedom and equality” is restricted to only white people, for those who are nonwhite are 
considered to be born “unfree” and “unequal,” with the inability to ever change this (Mills, p. 
16). Thus, Mills uses this to conclude that the “Western moral and political thought” only applies 





The last component of Mill’s racial contract which will be the main focus for this thesis is 
the epistemology of ignorance. According to Mills, the norms in the racial contract are guided by 
an epistemology that uses blindness or ignorance of race to determine “what counts as moral and 
factual knowledge of the world” (Mills, p. 17). In his argument, he states that white people learn 
to see the world mistakenly, and these perceptions are later validated by “white epistemic 
authority” (Mills, p.18). He further argues that it is through these “global cognitive functions” 
that are produced both psychologically and socially, which create the “white misunderstanding, 
misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race” (Mills, p. 19). It is this 
ignorance that allows for the structures and norms of “white polity” to continue (Mills, p. 19). 
This is because when this white epistemology is used to tell what is right and what is wrong, it 
results in the outcome of white people not being able to see the truth of the role race plays in the 
world around them, and instead live in an “invented delusional world, a racial fantasyland a 
‘consensual hallucination…” (Mills, p. 18). Thus, a condition of whiteness in the racial contract 
is that it “precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of social realities” (Mills, p. 
18).  
This ignorance or lack of foreknowledge of what is occurring will gain more significance 
with the support of Danielle Allen’s theories on sacrifice and how they relate to Black racial 
forgiveness. In Danielle Allen’s book Talking to Strangers, Allen argues that sacrifice is an 
inevitable and essential part of democracy (2004). This is because society’s citizen's interests and 
views will always contradict in some way (Hooker, 2016). Consequently, any political decisions 
made will always result in some who lose and those who win. As a result, Allen says “citizens 
thus have to learn to reconcile themselves to the experience of losing” (Hooker, p. 451). Built on 





community, Allen argues that preserving democratic stability can only be achieved by some 
acceding their decisions for the sake of a “collection democratic action” (Allen, p. 28-29). 
In an ideal democracy, Allen argues these losses will be distributed equally among the 
population as the democratic institution and the decisions made by it, continue to evolve (Allen, 
2004). Thus, those who bear the burden of these effects will continue to change alongside it so 
that not one single group will continue to lose as a result of collective action. Danielle Allen 
recognizes that this is merely a dream of what democracy should and could look like, however, it 
is not yet a reality due to the sacrifice in our society resting only on the shoulders of a few. 
This foundational argument made by Allen in her book begins with the story of Elizabeth 
Eckford and the confrontation following the desegregation of Central Rock High school in Little 
Rock, Arkansas. On September 4th of 1957, a famous photograph of Elizabeth depicts her 
walking away from an angry mob of white people cursing at her and wishing her dead as she 
carries her books back to the bus stop (Allen, 2004). This photograph was taken moments after 
the Arkansas National Guard Elizabeth disallowed Elizabeth from entering her school on the first 
day of class (Allen, 2004). 
Allen uses this photo to portray the power of human habits. She argues that in this photo, 
both Hazel and Elizabeth are not participating in unusual acts (Allen, 2004). For Hazel, she and 
the other white people in the photograph are practicing the exclusionary habit of keeping the 
public spaces to themselves (Allen, 2004). For Elizabeth, she too is “acquiescing to such norms 
and to the acts of violence that enforced them” as done by many other Southern Black citizens in 
the South (Allen, p. 4). Thus, by capturing each set of norms that are found in the public sphere -
- dominance and acquiescence -- this photo “stripped away idealized conceptions of democratic 





despite the standing law” (Allen, p. 4). 
Going further, according to Allen, political order is governed not only by our political 
institutions but by “deep rules” that “prescribe specific interactions among citizens in its public 
spaces…” (Allen, 2004, p. 10). Another way we could think about these rules are a set of moral 
codes, as discussed by Mills. For Elizabeth, Allen argues that these rules or habits she formed as 
a result of her Black identity includes the habit of sacrifice for the sake of stabilizing the public 
sphere - a ritual that is not part of Hazel Bryant’s identity (Allen, 2004). Allen uses Elizabeth as 
a potent example for her overarching argument: Black Americans inequitably make sacrifices in 
their social roles to ensure a more stable political institution - whether done intentionally or not. 
In her example, Allen hopes to show that Elizabeth’s “peaceful endurance of racial violence was 
a form of civic sacrifice” (Hooker, p. 453). For she is just one example of the “political heroism 
of ordinary African Hooker Americans” (Hooker, 453). Allen believes this habit of sacrifice over 
time embedded itself into the role and identity of Black citizenship. With this knowledge, Allen 
believes it can be used to help form the “basis of a new approach to citizenship” - one that 
recognizes and appreciates this heroism (Allen, p. 114). 
In conversation with Allen, Ralph Ellison agrees that the Black sacrifice Elizabeth 
participated in is a sacrifice, but he also argues it is done for preserving one’s safety. In Talking 
to Strangers, Ellison remarks that Black parents must “teach their children that the political and 
legal worlds are imbricated in a social context (sometimes of terror) that constrains the 
possibilities for action supposedly protected by law” (Allen, p. 30). This is because Black 
citizens in the U.S. “had a special duty to sacrifice the need for revenge (Hooker, p. 453). In this 
view, Black adults learn and must then teach their children how to meet “racial terror with 





inevitably be asked to make (Hooker, p. 453). Ellison says the photograph taken of Elizabeth 
marked a day “we learned about forbearance and forgiveness in that same school, and about hope 
too. So today we sacrifice, as we sacrificed yesterday, the pleasure of personal retaliation in the 
interest of the common good’ WS 342” (Allen, p. 29). Through this process of sacrificing this 
retaliation, Ellison believes Black citizens acquire “extra knowledge about the      nature of 
democracy,” for they know what it is like for their social and political worlds collide (Allen, 
2004, p. 116). 
Returning now to Allen’s arguments on habits, Allen says from the time we are young we 
all take part in these human rituals that ultimately help to form our identity and “initiate people 
into the symbol world, ideals, and political structure of their community” argues Allen (Allen, p. 
27). She goes on to say these rituals, in turn, help to “solidify social order” and influence our 
views of political institutions and our roles within them (Allen, p. 28). Thus, if sacrifice becomes 
part of one’s ritual beginning in childhood, just as it is argued to be for Elizabeth, Allen believes 
that this influences how one views their standing and role in the political and social realms of 
society. We can think about this phenomenon hypothetically; if you are taught from the time you 
are young that your habits must include sacrifice, it would be instinctual for you to make a 
sacrifice when you’re faced with either the threat of racial violence, such as Elizabeth was, or to 
acquiesce when addressing someone whose juxtaposed habits include the role of dominance. 
Furthermore, if there is a prospect of you being honored for abiding by these prescribed habits 
and the dominant group reassures and validates these actions, then this sacrifice becomes even 
more enticing. 
While this reoccurrence of sacrifice is acknowledged by Allen to be unequally burdened 





in her argument that this sacrifice is nonetheless an inevitable and essential part of democratic 
life. She finds virtue in this “democratic sacrifice,” and goes on in her book to theorize what our 
ideal democracy would look like when more legitimate forms of sacrifice are included.  
She argues that there are several attributes to creating the ideal, legitimate, and equitable 
sacrifice needed for a Democracy. The first being foreknowledge, or the realization of the status 
quo of inequitable sacrifices made by some citizens for the sake of the greater good. Without the 
recognition that the burdens of sacrifice are not divided equally among all citizens, there is no 
hope for this status quo to change. Next is consent to the sacrifice. Allen states that the defining 
feature between a “sacrificer” and a victim, is that the sacrifice is consented to or given 
“knowingly” by the sacrificer, while a victim does not understand or recognize what they gave 
up (Allen, 2004, p. 29). Therefore, those who sacrifice willingly understand what is being given 
up and still consent to forego those interests. Furthermore, to be legitimate the sacrifice must not 
always be undertaken by only one party. To have an “equality of sacrifice,” “those who promote 
sacrifices for others should also expect to bear themselves…” (Allen, p. 110 &111). Following 
this statement then, Elizabeth’s sacrifice only transitioned from a “symptom of domination into 
an equity” when citizens across the country recognized her sacrifice and would “reciprocate her 
self-sacrifice by accepting changes to their political regime” (Allen, p.155). If this reciprocation 
does not occur, however, the domination can be expected to continue. 
The last attribute of legitimate sacrifice is that the performance should bring about the 
prospect of honor, and most importantly, reciprocity. Allen believes that allowing legitimate 
sacrifice to be thought of as honorable and a gift that should later be reciprocated towards that 
person, can “rejuvenate political friendships” by bringing about a sense of mutual obligation 





must be taken by someone, so the receiver of the sacrifice feels as though they are receiving a 
gift (Allen, 2004). These so-called “signal sacrifices” are then repeated until it generates a 
“goodwill” amongst the receiving parties that causes them to reciprocate the sacrifice later. It is 
this pattern of sacrifice and reciprocity that proceeds to build a relationship of trust that did not 
exist before and forms a new “equitable” relationship that is now free from self-interest (Allen, 
p. 155). The people who make these signal sacrifices are those that “have in the past been and 
will again in the future be willing to accept decisions that benefit themselves less than others” 
(Allen, p. 155). 
This signal sacrifice Allen refers to is intended to send a message to others that you are 
willing to set aside your self-interest for the sake of creating a friendship or establish a 
relationship of trust. In this argument, she is relying on the recipient to be an empathetic or 
rational actor that is willing to acknowledge this gift as an honor and will later reciprocate it in 
the future to ensure the friendship is maintained or created. The steps Allen outlines are intended 
to create new “healthy modes” of citizenship that will cause the diseased part of inequitable 
sacrifice in our democracy to die off. As more people choose to commit legitimate sacrifice, 
Allen believes it can turn into a “political weapon” (Allen, p. 116) A weapon with the ability to 
“agree, to sacrifice, to bear burdens to force contradictions in the citizenship of the dominated, 
until this citizenship caves in upon the rottenness of its inherent ills” (Allen, p. 116). 
For these reasons, I believe Allen would approve of the actions taken by Brandt Jean in 
the Dallas courtroom. His forgiveness is a signal sacrifice done in commitment to forging an 
equitable relationship built upon a new foundation of trust, love, and faith. We can hear echoes 
of Allen’s arguments in media spotlights such as the statement heard around the world in 2016, 





Obama discusses how she intended this statement as an encouragement for others to move 
forward with action instead of lingering over the pain; “It means that your response has to 
reflect the solution. It shouldn’t come from a place of anger or vengefulness. Barack and   I 
had to figure that out. Anger may feel good in the moment, but it’s not going to move the 
ball forward.” (Bruner, 2018). This solution Michelle Obama is referring to is using the 
prospect of a hopeful and brighter future, as a tool to set aside indifference in the hope that others 
will see the sacrifice made for the sake of the greater good and reciprocate the same respect. 
Sharing in commonality, within Danielle Allen’s argument, Brandt Jean’s speech and 
Michelle Obama’s quote “when they go low, we go high,” reciprocity in each scenario is the 
foundation in which the action stands upon. If the action is not reciprocated, each of the models 
falls apart. For Elizabeth’s sacrifice at Central Rock High School, as noted earlier, without 
political change (reciprocity) occurring in response to her signal sacrifice, her act would stay a 
“symptom of domination” (Allen, p. 155). In the case of Michelle Obama’s quote, if one 
continues to go high while others choose not to, then that is setting the acquiescent side up for 
the continual loss. Thus, while Allen’s contributions are successful when approaching sacrifice 
from a bird’s eye view, her argument falls short by failing to address the preexisting 
sociopolitical pathologies in play that prevent reciprocity from happening in the daily lives of 
those living under our Democratic institution. It must be noted that I am not arguing that her 
model is wrong, however, by not taking into account certain situations where reciprocity does 
not occur, her model inadvertently promotes the practice it is trying to prevent under the guise of 
doing something good. One scenario where this occurs is when applied to Black racial 
forgiveness. 





manifests itself because it is also a form of peaceful acquiescence from a subordinated group that 
is learned. In general, Allen’s model when applied to many situations can provide significant 
value to our society by helping to form new relationships and creating a platform for the 
sacrifices made in our society to be recognized, honored, and reciprocated. Nonetheless, while 
her vision is beneficial, those who are non-white must be cautious about the types of sacrifices 
that are engaged in and promoted. If acquiescence in the form of forgiveness is considered a 
virtue to restore community relations as a whole, and Allen’s “vision democratic citizenship 
demands of racially subordinated groups that they pursue political projects aimed at making the 
entire political community more just and free,” we must then consider, could “fulfilling such 
obligations could come at the expense of their own interests and claims to justice?” (Hooker, p. 
454). I argue when placing Black racial forgiveness and its implications in the context of Allen’s 
framework, the effects reinforce the racial dominance of white supremacy that the sacrifice is 
intended to break down under Allen’s model. 
Allen’s framework does not allow for the intended consequences when applied to Black 
racial forgiveness in two ways. The first way being because Allen sets the condition that 
foreknowledge of the sacrifice is necessary for the sacrifice to be considered legitimate (Allen, 
2004). This is so that the recipient of this gift is aware that they are receiving a gift from the 
other actor (Allen, 2004). When Black racial sacrifice occurs, however, often the actor who made 
the sacrifice in unaware they are making a sacrifice because the act is ingrained within the 
learned social habits passed down from parents and further impressed upon them from the 
sociopolitical climate. Therefore, while the Black actor may consent to the act of forgiveness 
itself, there is a problem when the impact of forgiveness is not understood or consented to. This 





paper. I hope that with this knowledge, the actors if they choose to forgive, will understand the 
entire scope of its implications, and raise caution for others. 
To continue, Black racial forgiveness is different because the one receiving the gift of the 
sacrifice is a white individual, as defined within the condition of racial forgiveness being 
between interracial actors. Thus, according to my definition and following along Allen’s model, 
the white actor would need foreknowledge of the Black sacrifice being made and see themselves 
as a recipient of a gift that they will reciprocate. The problem with this picture, however, is that 
the act of Black racial forgiveness is seen as normative sacrifice within our Democracy. Thus, 
the white actor will not see racial forgiveness as a gift but rather an expected role that is being 
properly fulfilled as a result of the functions of white supremacy. This idea of expectation 
concerning Black racial forgiveness will be analyzed in more detail with the help of arguments 
from Robin DiAngelo further along in the paper. 
Secondly, Allen’s framework cannot be applied because Black racial forgiveness as a 
sacrifice is not an effective form of civic idealism due to it being inherently non-reciprocal. This 
I argue, is due to the existence of white fragility, as theorized by Robin DiAngelo. White 
fragility is defined as a “state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes 
intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves (DiAngelo, p. 54). These defensive actions 
may include outward displays of guilt, anger, fear, that serve to “reinstate white racial 
equilibrium” (DiAngelo, p. 54). 
According to DiAngelo, white fragility is created by white individuals living within an 
“insulated environment of racial privilege” that allows them to be protected from stress due to 
confronting racial realities (DiAngelo, p. 55). Moreover, given this constant protection it, in turn, 





ability to tolerate racial stress” (DiAngelo, p. 55). Returning to Allen’s argument regarding 
foreknowledge of the sacrifice, due to the existence of white fragility, it is unlikely the racial 
implications of receiving the gift of sacrifice would be able to break through this barrier that is 
created out of the need to avoid racial triggers. Therefore, while the forgiveness may be 
understood and valued, the action will not be seen as a sacrifice that is racially and socio-
politically significant when there is a lack of acknowledgment of the role race, and whiteness 
plays in the world. 
White fragility in the context of this paper will be later used to help support the 
expectation of racial forgiveness by contemplating the inverse effect, what happens when Black 
racial forgiveness does not occur? By foregoing Black racial forgiveness, it triggers white 
fragility because a person of color chose “not to protect the racial feelings of white people,” and 
therefore challenges their need for “racial comfort” (DiAngelo, p. 57). 
Now that Black racial forgiveness is defined and the scope of both what is and what it is 
not is narrowed, we must turn to why it matters. Returning to my original hypothesis, I argue 
early on in this paper that Black racial forgiveness makes the case for reparations and civically 
disobedient behavior problematic because it undermines Black people’s moral and rhetorical 
basis for political challenges to the racial status quo of white supremacy. This is what we will 
now focus on. 
To bring back the question posed earlier towards Danielle Allen’s arguments, could 
“fulfilling such obligations could come at the expense of their own interests and claims to 
justice?” (Hooker, p. 454). This critique is proposed by Juliet Hooker, author of the essay “Black 
Lives Matter and the Paradoxes of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic 





arguments on Black racial forgiveness’ impact on Black activism and consequently why we must 
approach Black racial forgiveness with caution. The purpose of Hooker’s essay is to challenge 
the “undue democratic sacrifice” that Allen offers in her argument, and in turn, explain the 
burdens associated with Black citizens being held as a form of “democratic exemplarity” 
(Hooker, 448). 
In her essay, Hooker is quick to call into question Danielle Allen’s theoretical 
framework. Hooker contends that Allen’s example of Elizabeth’s “peaceful acquiescence” and 
her persuasive words that turn these “perpetual losses” into forms for “exemplary citizenship,” 
ultimately fails to challenge the inequity of loss, and instead serve to allow these losses to 
continue (Hooker, 2016, p. 452). Hooker contends that since the reciprocity Allen’s argument 
rests upon will never occur following a Black sacrifice, it, therefore “calls into question not only 
the integrity of U.S. democracy but also the kinds of democratic obligations that can be fairly 
placed upon black citizens as a result” (Hooker. P. 449). Going further, she poses this important 
question to readers, “when other citizens and state institutions betray a pervasive lack of concern 
for black suffering (which in turn makes it impossible for those wrongs to be redressed), is it fair 
to ask blacks to make further sacrifices on behalf of the polity?” (Hooker, p. 449). In Allen’s 
argument, while she believes inequitable sacrifice is illegitimate, she hopes that through 
continual signal sacrifices reciprocity will kick into gear and mutual obligation will occur. 
Hooker challenges this by asking Allen to draw a line in the sand and consider at what point does 
it become “unjust” for us to expect this “peaceful acquiescence?” (Hooker, 2016, p. 454). 
Moreover, by Allen arguing that these sacrifices are politically exemplary, as reflected in the 
awards given to Brandt Jean for his forgiveness, Hooker warns of the dangers of these acts. She 





a kind of civic sacrifice of blacks that is not expected of other citizens” (Hooker, p. 455). 
Folded within this expectation for Black citizens to make these sacrifices comes the 
question, what happens when the peaceful acquiescence of forgiveness does not occur? To this, 
Hooker uses the example of the Black Lives Matter Movement (BLM) and discusses people’s 
common criticisms of it. One of which is its “failure to emulate the political exemplarity of the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s” (Hooker, p. 456). Others say Black activists are “failing to 
follow the (alleged) disciplined adherence to non-violence of earlier antiracist struggles, for not 
embodying black respectability, not adopting a visible hierarchical leadership structure, not 
formulating clear policy goals, etc.” (Hooker, p. 456). The difference between the civil rights 
movement and these protests, Hooker argues, is that these protests are not aimed towards 
submitting innocent bodies to violence to reveal to the white audience the monstrosities that are 
occurring. Thus, the people who make the comments against the BLM movement are those 
unwilling to stand behind a movement where there is no “willing sacrifice” on behalf of the 
Black population to achieve political change.  
We can see this “demonization” of Black protestors following the death of twenty-five-
year-old Freddie Gray who suffered a fatal spinal cord injury as a result of police brutality during 
the Baltimore protests. (BBC, 2016). While these protestors were simply demanding answers and 
justice, some called them instead “unlawful riots” which undermines the purpose of the protests 
(Hooker, p. 459). 
This willingness to compare modern Black activism to the civil rights movement and to 
consequently demonize them stems from a commonly romanticized narrative of the civil rights 
movement, says Hooker (2016). In these narratives and teachings, she states that often the intra-





racial justice” or the “efficacy of non-violence” is skipped over (Hooker, p. 457). Furthermore, 
by making this movement the standard in which we compare other forms of Black activism, it 
serves to “pre-emptively delegitimize” and discount other forms of action based on false notions 
of the movement itself (Hooker, p. 457). 
This peaceful acquiescence from Black activists as understood through the lens of the 
romanticized image serves as a standard by which all Black activist performances are now 
critiqued against, argues Hooker (2016). She argues that it “places a burden of responsibility for 
repairing racial wrongs upon those who are already most harmed by racism,” all while it “rests 
on misguided assumptions about how to achieve racial justice that might prevent the dismantling 
of white supremacy in the long run” (Hooker, p. 457). Finally, it requires a Black innocence and 
sacrifice that some are unwilling to make. She uses this comparison to the civil rights movement 
to show how innocence is now a requirement for white individuals to accept the racial injustice 
occurring (Hooker, 2016). Considering this to be a true statement, it consequently serves to shift 
the discussion of the movements away from the injustice that is occurring, to a question of 
whether the person is deserving of justice based on their Black innocence (Hooker, 2016). A 
peaceful acquiescence is needed for their actions to be considered legitimate or worthy of “white 
empathy” (Hooker, 2016, p. 30). 
By arguing this romanticized image is used by reactionaries to reject calls for racial 
justice, we can see how acts of Black racial forgiveness are doing a similar thing. We can 
contemplate this argument by considering the alternative to Brant Jean’s forgiveness. Consider 
whether instead of hugging and forgiving Amber Guyger, Brandt Jean instead gave an 
impassioned speech that critiqued the police brutality, systemic injustices, and loose gun culture 





would not be received or praised by the same crowd that gave him the Ethical Courage award. In 
this situation, Brant would be directly challenging the existing status of racial comfort. Therefore, 
according to DiAngelo’s theory, this racial stress will cause a white backlash to restore the status 
quo of white domination. In this case, when the colorblindness of the white epistemology is 
confronted with the implications of the white race as expressed through Brandt Jean not 
acquiescing, it is a direct challenge to the moral, political, and epistemological contracts at hand. 
Action must, therefore, be taken to restore the white equilibrium at stake. 
Returning now to the arguments of Robin DiAngelo, his framework will help to further 
support the ideas brought up by Hooker. By applying his arguments of racial comfort and white 
fragility to the context of Black racial forgiveness I use his theories to support the expectation of 
Black racial forgiveness as a result of its efforts towards maintaining the white equilibrium. 
DiAngelo begins his arguments by clarifying that the modes of white fragility that seek to restore 
the white equilibrium should be conceptualized as a response that is created and reinforced by 
the constant “social and material advantages of whiteness” (DiAngelo, p. 248). These advantages 
were referenced by Mills in his political and moral contract. He argues that the backlash is 
consequently done in earnest to make up what is lost via the challenge to racial comfort 
(DiAngelo, 2016). This action is not always made consciously but rather one that is done 
automatically or out of instinct. 
This instinct he states is a result of the insulated environment that white privilege people 
live in – an environment that does not allow for a “tolerance for racial comfort” to be built 
(DiAngelo, p. 60). Given this constant exposure to an isolated environment, norms are created 
that expect this racial comfort to continue. Black racial forgiveness, I argue, is one expectation 





In DiAngelo’s argument, he highlights several specific situations that pose as triggers for 
the racial stress that disrupts existing racial comfort. These triggers include; 1). “people of color 
choosing not to protect the racial feelings of white people in regard to race (challenge to white 
expectations and need/entitlement to racial comfort) 2). Being presented with a person of color in 
a leadership position (challenge to white authority)” (DiAngelo, p. 247). When the expectation of 
Black racial forgiveness goes unfulfilled, each of these triggers occurs simultaneously. This is 
because when forgiveness does not occur, the racial feelings of the white transgressor are not 
being protected due to their victimization being openly denied in a public setting. Moreover, 
referring back to previous sections, Black racial forgiveness is a type of political forgiveness, 
meaning there is a debt owed to the victim on behalf of the transgressor. Therefore, at this 
moment when the white victimization is in question, the person of color in this instance holds a 
role of power over the white offender by being able to choose whether to restore their civic status 
or not. Thus, by choosing to restore this status and return the environment to the status quo ante 
of white racial comfort, the person of color will be rewarded for doing so. Subsequently, other 
white people will also support the act of forgiveness with praise to further reaffirm the status of 
white domination and allow for the structures of the white polity to continue. 
Going further with this idea of victimization, another way we can think about this is how 
white people “have historically been the winners in U.S. democracy” which “shaped their 
political imagination” (Hooker, p. 455). Thus, by living with a “political imagination not shaped 
by loss” it further increases their expectation to come out as winners, or in the case of Black 
racial forgiveness, expect their debts to be forgiven (Hooker, p. 455). By not receiving this 
forgiveness, not only is the civic status not restored but the debt will still be owed to a person of 





Returning now to Juliet Hooker’s arguments and their relation to Black racial 
forgiveness, Black racial forgiveness is used as a tool for comparison for Black innocence. This, 
as a result, dictates how white people respond or empathize with the Black victim as determined 
by whether their response is deemed acquiescent, innocent, or respectable enough to earn white 
empathy. As discussed with the help of DiAngelo, this respectability politic is used to restore the 
white equilibrium that is lost. Thus, when forgiveness does not occur, a backlash occurs. Now 
that these ideas are established, I offer a new way Black racial forgiveness undermines the case 
for Black activism in addition to its mechanisms that restore white supremacy. 
I argue Black racial forgiveness ultimately serves as a catharsis to other Black activist 
movements. At the end of Hooker’s essay she makes a powerful statement: “In the tragic 
political trap created by the transmutation of black sacrifice into democratic exemplarity, there is 
very little room for blacks to express outrage at injustice, or to enact a politics of defiance of 
their expected status as peaceful democratic losers” (Hooker, p. 462). It is in this little room for a 
political movement that she describes, where my argument settles. Danielle Allen, Digeser, and 
DiAngelo’s arguments all help to establish that reciprocity is not an aspect of Black racial 
forgiveness, nor is the prospect for receiving justice for a racial transgression. Thus, when those 
who seek other means of justice and defy the expectation for forgiveness, white backlash is 
likely to demonize these actions. What has yet to be touched on, however, is when Black racial 
forgiveness occurs, and how this affects the Black protestors who continue to demand justice 
despite the forgiveness already occurring. This is where that little space Hooker outlines, begins 
to shrink even more. 
DiAngelo’s arguments address the backlash that occurs when white expectations for 





expected and a person follows through with it, those who are left still protesting for rectificatory 
justice are met with increased hostility. In this scenario, there is an urge from white people to 
both encourage the performance of forgiveness for its efforts to restore the balance of white 
domination, while simultaneously dampen the efforts of Black activists who continue their 
efforts. This is because they serve as racial stress triggers. Thus, with each of these pressures 
forced on either side, it maliciously affects Black people’s rhetorical and moral basis for calls to 
action because they will now be seen as illegitimate and unjustified in their behaviors due to the 
victim choosing to forgive the white transgressor. 
Furthermore, when Black racial forgiveness already occurs, it serves to add fuel to the 
fire for the white individuals who are now able to call these performances unnecessary, spiteful, 
or vengeful. This is due to the rationalization that if the victim can forgive, so should everyone 
else. Consequently, the activism is then seen as merely a series of unjustified acts that ignore the 
virtuous and more respectful path forward that forgiveness offers. In this instance, the historical, 
social, political, and racial context of the performance is being ignored. As a result of this 
perspective, the legs of Black activists are cut out from under them through this delegitimization 
due to the white audience’s epistemological ignorance that ignores the racial and political 
implications of the performance. 
Moving now to my second argument. Shown at the beginning of this paper, a twitter user 
commented: “The only thing Brandt Jean’s #forgiveness has done is give racist white people a 
new go-to ‘You people should be more like…’ example to weaponize against black people when 
they do something horrific and racist and don’t want to be held accountable” (Dav-O, 2019). In 
this tweet, the user is expressing his reluctance to being compared to Brandt Jean’s actions, and 





Black community. It is his reaction and frustration that I aim to highlight as my second 
implication for Black racial forgiveness and that is the need for peaceful acquiescence if 
forgiveness is not followed. To support this point, a quote used by Hooker and originally written 
by Dora Apel depicts the important relationship between the portrayal of Black passivity in 
social media when engaging in political activism. 
The submissive hands up gesture of black protesters facing a militarized police force is 
meant to appeal to liberal sympathies by showing that they are “respectful” and law- 
abiding, suggesting the opposite of “uppity.” [In the 1960s] . . . images of blacks offering 
no resistance to police violence were selected by white editors because it was easier to 
gain white liberal sympathy by visually defining racism as excessive acts of brutality, 
from which moderate and liberal whites could distance themselves, while at the same 
time their racial anxiety could be quelled by the picturing of black nonresistance.” 
(Hooker, p. 461). 
 
In this section, Apel is arguing for a “racialized visual economy” in relation to how Black 
protestors are viewed in images. I use her statement to highlight the relationship between non- 
resistant Black protests and the use of their images by white people who need to quell the “racial 
anxiety” invoked by non-forgiveness. One popular image that does so circulated in 2014. It 
depicts the late Devonte Hart hugging a riot police officer with tears flowing down his cheeks 
while he attends a protest following the court ruling on the death of Michael Brown. This image 
went on to circulate on media channels such as Reddit, ABC News, CBS News, Fox News, 
NBC's "Today" Show, and "Saturday Night Live" (Jr., 2018). These images, Apel argues, are 
used to gain white sympathy by depicting a form of non-resistance or acquiescence that is not a 
racial trigger for sympathizers. What does the opposite, however, are images and rhetoric of 
resistant forms of Black protests. It is when Black activism is non-acquiescent, that it directly 
collides with white racial comfort. 
When these resistances occur and Black forgiveness does not, the performance of Black 





the fact that forgiveness is set as a precedent to be compared to and expected. In these instances, 
I argue backlash follows this non-acquiescent Black activism specifically because it is being 
compared to Black racial forgiveness and used as a comparative norm to question the efficacy of 
these more radical performances. Thus, instead of receiving the message that the acts send, the 
focus instead will be, why can’t you just forgive like Brandt Jean? 
Furthermore, the more radical these acts are, radical meaning the further from 
acquiescence, they will also be seen as violent. DiAngelo states that “Whites often confuse 
comfort with safety and state that we don’t feel safe when what we mean is that we don’t feel 
comfortable” (DiAngelo, p. 61). He goes on to say that this result “trivializes our history of 
brutality towards people of color and perverts the reality of that history” (DiAngelo, p. 61). By 
describing non-acquiescent Black activism as “unlawful riots,” this choice of words invokes a 
feeling of fear and violence. According to DiAngelo’s argument, however, these words are 
simply a reaction to the discomfort the actions impose upon white people, rather than stemming 
from an actual fear. Thus, the further white people are pushed by racial stress, the more they will 
confuse these so-called radical acts as violent which discredits the participants and the calls for 
the justice they are trying to make. 
When reading my offered definition and analysis of Black racial forgiveness, perhaps the 
most common critique will be by those who stand by Brandt Jean’s forgiveness and claim that 
there is nothing wrong with his act because forgiveness in any sense is a virtue. To this, I 
contend that to see Black racial forgiveness as non-problematic, one must first be unable to look 
past the white epistemology of ignorance. To fully grasp this concept there must be a foundation 
that recognizes or acknowledges the institutional and social mechanisms of white supremacy that 





supremacy is taken to be a fact in this paper. Furthermore, those who are unable to see why 
Black racial forgiveness is problematic are ignoring the long history of privilege and 
socialization that led to this movement of forgiveness. It is denying the idea that race shapes how 
Brandt Jean or the numerous other victims of police brutality such as Ahmaud Arbery are denied 
their proper right to justice. 
Therefore, while some white people may recognize “Whiteness as real,” it will often go 
only be seen as “the individual problem of other “bad” white people” (DiAngelo, p. 59). In 
DiAngelo’s work, he discusses how white people tend to see their experience as universal 
(DiAngelo, 2016). He states this leads to colorblindness by denying the importance of race and 
whiteness play in the world. This will lead many reasonable people to perhaps use this 
individualistic perspective to claim that this forgiveness, while under extraordinary 
circumstances, is what any reasonable and merciful person would, and should do regardless of 
the racial and political implications at play. 
Finally, with these added complications and implications taken into account, this leaves 
us with the question of what the right course of action is. In this paper, the concept of Black 
racial forgiveness is shown to create an expectation of Black sacrifice that is both an exemplary 
form of citizenship, while also being non-reciprocal. It also is revealed to reinforce the 
mechanisms of white supremacy by existing within the white epistemology and maintaining 
racial comfort. When Black racial forgiveness does not occur, it serves to delegitimize any 
claims for justice from Black activists by being a catharsis and a tool for comparison. 
To first address Black racial forgiveness as an exemplary sacrifice, the goal of this 
argument is not to deter all Black people from forgiving white people for their transgressions, 





shed light on something most people recognize is happening but are unaware of its effects. For 
this reason, I am not arguing to stop all forms of forgiveness, however, I am hoping to express 
the need for caution and to view forgiveness with a critical eye when there is a political meaning 
and racial meaning behind the act. 
To help this point along we can return to the example of Brant Jean. The forgiveness he 
participated in was emotional, religious, and political forgiveness. The intent of my argument is 
not to say that Brandt should not forgive Amber to fulfill his emotional needs, nor is it to 
criticize his personal choice to carry out his religious teachings. The problem is that Brant Jean 
simultaneously participated in Black racial forgiveness in a public setting. Due to Brant Jean’s 
identity as a Black male, the people who celebrate and promote his actions are participating in 
mechanisms of white supremacy and will never reciprocate the same forgiveness. His actions 
will go on to reverberate and have consequences far beyond his intended act, whether he did it 
out of the kindness of his heart or not. For this reason, we must approach interracial forgiveness 
when it’s politically significant with caution. I am not critiquing emotional or religious 
forgiveness, rather the third hidden aspect, Black racial forgiveness. 
The second effect of Black racial forgiveness’s impact on Black activism is a bit more 
challenging to solve. My hope for this essay is to show the challenges Black activism faces in 
light of the expectation for acquiescence. I will not pose a solution for this, however, Juliet 
Hooker at the end of her essay does suggest an interesting perspective. She states: 
“Riots (for lack of a better term) might thus constitute a form of democratic repair for 
African Americans, not because they are a solution to structural problems and 
institutionalized injustices, but because they allow black citizens to express their pain and 
make their losses visible to a racial order that demands that they sacrifice both by not 
expressing anger and grief at said losses, and also by peacefully acquiescing to them.” 







I agree with Hooker’s sentiments. Though this thesis discusses Black activism in 
conversation with the tendrils of white supremacy that prevent awareness, appreciation, or even 
empathy for the injustices these acts seek to show, this idea of riots Hooker proposes does 
address one major unanswered challenge brought up in this paper by Danielle Allen. Though 
radical acts of Black activism face significant problems with white empathy and will most likely 
not solve them due to the problems this paper argues, Hooker suggests they are a way to combat 
the exemplary act of sacrifice Danielle Allen suggests. Riots, she suggests, enables the Black 
community to feel the raw emotion one is entitled to feel when your friends and family are 
allowed to be killed with little to no consequences. Thus, instead of being expected to put aside 
these emotions and forgive for the sake of democratic stability or to show peaceful acquiescence 
so white people remain comforted, these performances express the raw grief that the public 
sphere does not allow or condone. 
In the end, I chose to create this new concept because it is one that challenges our most 
visceral beliefs as humans on radical love, faith, race, and the norms our Democracy operates 
under. I hope that when the next time you hear or read about a story on the news where Black 
innocence and forgiveness are highlighted, the topics of this paper will allow you to 
acknowledge the implications it carries for the victim, the transgressor, and the contract of white 
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